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Supreme Court Docket No. 38471-2011 
Bannock County Case No. 2009-2212 
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Clayson devotes many pages of his Brief to establish that he put time, money and 
effort into refurbishing the cheese plant. That is not disputed by Zebe and Lawson. Zebe 
and Lawson did not argue in Appellants' Brief on Appeal that Clayson did not put time, 
money and effort into refurbishing the cheese plant. Zebe's and Lawson's argument is that 
they are not liable to Clayson for that time, money-and effort because, among other things, 
Zebe and Lawson did not own the cheese plant and restaurant when the improvements were 
made to it and when they bought the cheese plant and restaurant from a third party they paid 
for the improvements. 
CLAYSON REFURBISHED THE CHEESE PLANT BECAUSE OF PROlVIISES BY 
FARINELLA, NOT BECAUSE OF PROMISES BY ZEBE AND LAWSON 
Farinella owned the cheese plant when Clayson made the improvements for which he 
now seeks payment. In fact, Clayson makes it clear in his Brief that what he did, he did 
because of promises made by Farinella, not because of promises made by Zehe and Lawson: 
1. The owner [Farinella] told Mr. Clayson that he could do whatever he wanted 
to get the plant ready to reopen as long as it didn't cost the owner or 
bankruptcy court anything. (Appellee's Brief, p. 17) 
2. He [Farinella] promised Mr. Clayson he would clear title to the plant and make 
it possible for Mr. Clayson to buy the plant. (Appellee's Brief, p. 17) 
3. Mr. Clayson, relying on the promise of the owner [Farinella] worked all 
smmner and fall and spent substantial funds to refurbish the plant and get it 
ready to reopen. (Appellee's Brief, p. 17) 
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THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS CONTRACT TO 
REIMBURSE CLAYSON 
The trial court determined on motion for summary judgment that there was no 
partnership agreement between the parties and there was no express contract between the 
parties which would support a legal obligation on the part of Zebe and Lawson to reimburse 
Clayson for refurbishment expenses he incurred because of promises from Farinella. (R. 
Vol. 2, pp. 251 - 258) Therefore, in order to recover againstZebe and Lawson, Clayson had 
to prove either a contract implied-in-fact or a contract implied-in-law. Contracts implied-in-
fact and implied-in-law are two different and distinct concepts. 
EQUITY DOES NOT INTERVENE WITH AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT 
WHEN AN EXPRESS CONTRACT COVERS THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER 
Clayson agrees 1 that an implied-in-fact contract requires evidence which supports the 
dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the requesting party 
promised payment. The trial court and Clayson agree that Clayson did not refurbish the 
cheese plant at the request of Zebe or Lawson or in reliance on a promise that Zebe and 
Lawson would pay for it. (R. Vol. 4, p. 738; Appellee's Brief, pp. 17 - 18) Instead, the 
trial court concluded, and Clayson argues in Appellee's Brief, that the obligation to pay 
Clayson arose as follows: 
1Clayson actually misquotes the decision in Fox v. Mt. W Elec., 137 Idaho 703, 708 
(Idaho 2002), but the substance of Clayson's argument makes it clear that he agrees that both 
elements of the dual inference must be present. 
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The Court finds that an implied-in-fact contract exists because Defendants 
conduct and statements create an implied agreement to pay Clayson's 
refurbishment expenses when he transferred operation of the Plant and 
restaurant to Defendants on October 8, 2008. 
(R. Vol. 4, p. 739; Appellee's Brief, p. 18) 
The trial court should not have imposed an implied agreement because there was an 
enforceable-written agreementcovering the same subject matter, i.e. the assignment which 
Clayson executed on November 4, 2008. (Exhibit N) The sequence of events which 
occurred beginning on October 8, 2008, is important. On October 8, 2009, Clayson 
relinquished his continued participation in the business. (R. Vol. 4, p. 732; Tr. Vol. 248, LL 
11 - 24) From October 8 forward Clayson left the premises, had no further involvement in 
SVC, and did not do any further work on the Plant. (R. Vol. 4, p. 732) The SVC articles 
were amended shortly thereafter to delete Clayson as a member. (R. Vol. 4, p. 732) On 
October 17, 2008, Clayson and Randall signed a written offer to purchase the Plant from Star 
Valley Cheese, Inc. [Farinella] for $800,000. (R. Vol. 4, p. 732; Exhibit D) The offer 
included all of the work that Clayson had contracted others to do, all of the materials that 
Clayson had requested others to supply, all of the buildings, all of the improvements, all of 
the property and all of the personal property Farinella, or his company, owned, in its then 
condition for a purchase price of $800,000. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 249, L 4 - p. 251, L 10) On 
November 4, 2008, Clayson assigned all his right, title and interest in the purchase and sale 
agreement to SVC, LLC. Zebe and Lawson were the only members of SVC at the time of 
the assignment. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 253, LL 11 - 25; Exhibit N) Clayson tried to get Zebe and 
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Lawson to agree to reimburse him for the refurbishment expenses before he would sign the 
assignment. Zebe and Lawson refused, but Clayson signed the assigmnent "without any 
agreement on that day that he would be reimbursed." (R. Vol. 4, p. 734; Tr. Vol. II, p. 481, 
L4-p.482,L14) 
"Equity does not intervene when an express contract prescribes the right to 
compensation." Vande,ford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 54 7, 5 5 8 (Idaho 2007); Shacocass, 
Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 116 Idaho 460, 464 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989); Wolford v. 
Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064 (Idaho 1984) (when the express agreement is found to be 
enforceable a court is precluded from applying the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment 
in contravention of the express contract) Clayson argues that it makes no sense that he 
would relinquish his interest in the LLC and assign his interest in the purchase and sale 
agreement unless some promise had been made to him. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 17 - 18) 
However, under the circumstances in this case equity should not have intervened to alter the 
poor bargain Clayson made for himself. 
Both Clayson and the trial court ignore the assignment by which Clayson assigned his 
interest in the purchase and sale agreement to an LLC in which he was not a member: 
Gaylen W. Clayson and Jeff Randall hereby assign all rights of said Contract 
to buy and Sell Real Estate to SVC, LLC a Wyoming LLC. 
Exhibit N 
By the assignment, Clayson relinquished any rights he had in the improvements. He 
had made those improvements for Farinella and after Clayson assigned the purchase and sale 
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agreement to Zebe and Lawson, Farinella was free to sell and Zebe and Lawson were free 
to buy the improvements without any further contractual obligation to pay Clayson. Courts 
do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable. 
Lavey v. Regence Blueshield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41 (Idaho 2003) That, however, is 
precisely_what the trial court did when it decided that in consideration for Clayson assigning 
his interest in the purchase and sale agreement he was entitled to be paid for refurbishing the 
property. (R. Vol. 2, p. 255) Clayson relinquished that entitlement when he signed the 
assignment. 
ZEBEANDLAWSONWERENOTUNJUSTLYENRICHEDBECAUSETHEYPAID 
$800,000 FOR THE PROPERTY WHICH INCLUDED CLAYSON'S 
IMPROVEMENTS 
Clayson argues on appeal that he conferred value on Zebe and Lawson by introducing 
them to the "opportunity" and that the "value" of the "opportunity" was Clayson's cost of 
perfonning the refurbishments. (Appellee's Brief, p. 19) 
The trial court did not find that the benefit was the "opportunity" nor did it value the 
"oppmiunity" that Clayson now claims he bestowed on Zebe and Lawson. Clayson had the 
burden of proving that Zebe and Lawson received a benefit and of proving the amount of 
the benefit which Zebe and Lawson unjustly retained. Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147 
Idaho 378, 389 (Idaho 2009) The trial court found the "benefit" was the improvements 
Clayson made to the restaurant and plant. The trial court found that on October 8 , 2008, 
Zebe and Lawson "took over a Plant and restaurant that was better than it had been before 
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Clayson's efforts and expenses." (R. Vol. 4, pp. 739 - 740) However, on October 8, 2008, 
Zebe and Lawson did not own anything so they did not and could not receive or accept the 
improvements. Zebe and Lawson had to purchase the improvements. 
Zebe and Lawson did not own anything until the October 17, 2008 purchase and sale 
agreement was assigned to them onNovember 4, 2008, and closed by them on February 24, 
2009, when Zebe and Lawson paid $800,000. The trial court and Clayson ignore that Zebe 
and Lawson paid for the improvements - they did not receive or accept anything without 
paying for it. Logically, one can assume that if Clayson had not improved the property it 
would have sold for less than $800,000. It is equally logical that the only person or entity 
which benefitted was Farinella or his business entity. That, however, does not give rise to 
an implied-in-law contract requiring Zebe and Lawson to reimburse Clayson for unjust 
enrichment. 
ZEBE'S POST-ASSIGNMENT STATEMENTS DO NOT GIVE RISE TO AN 
OBLIGATION TO PAY CLAYSON 
To the extent that Clayson and the trial court rely on Zebe's statements that he would 
pay Clayson something for his efforts before the assignment was signed on November 4, 
2008, any legal or equitable liability to pay Clayson was extinguished by the tenns of the 
assignment. Clayson assigned all right, title and interest in the contract to buy the property 
where he made the improvements. The trial court did not find the tenns of the assignment 
to be unconscionable. In the absence ofunconscionability, the trial court cannot rewrite the 
contract to make it more equitable just because the contractual provisions appear unwise or 
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their enforcement may seem harsh. Lavey v. Regence Blueshield o.f Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 42 
(Idaho 2003) 
However, Zebe made statements after November 4, 2009, to persons and entities 
other than Clayson on which the trial court and Clayson rely to support an equitable remedy 
against Zebe and Lawson. None of these statements is an Tmequivocaraffirmaiion that Zebe 
and Lawson agreed to pay Clayson. None of these statements establish how much or for 
what specific expenditures Clayson was to be reimbursed. None of the post November 4, 
2009 statements were made to Clayson. (R. Vol. 4, pp. 735 - 736) 
These statements do not create an equity obligation to reimburse Clayson. The only 
way that these statements could give rise to an obligation to pay Clayson is if the statements 
corroborate or confirm a contract to reimburse Clayson. A distinct understanding common 
to both parties is necessary in order for a contract to exist. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 
696 (Idaho 1992) The basic elements of a contract are subject matter, consideration, mutual 
assent by all the parties to all the tenns, and an agreement that is expressed plainly and 
explicitly enough to show what the parties have agreed. State v. Korn, 224 P.3d 480, 482 
(Idaho 2009) 
There was never a mutual agreement about how much Clayson was to be paid so no 
contract to do so came into existence. Clayson claims Zebe and Lawson agreed to reimburse 
him approximately $130,000 for bills he paid. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 201 - 204) The bills listed on 
the first page of Exhibit "F" do not total anything close to $130,000. Exhibit F totals 
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$69,600. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 205 - 209) The bills Clayson could actually substantiate with a 
check or credit card are a different amount, i.e. $97,310,24 which includes the $50,000 check 
to Dairy Systems2 • This is what the trial court detennined that Zebe and Lawson owed 
Clayson. (R. Vol. 4, p. 740) None of the post-November 4, 2008 statements by Zebe even 
mention a dollar am-ount. WhciJ was the-contract? Was it $130,000? Was it $69,600? Was 
it $97,310.24? Clayson never testified that there was a verbal agreement to pay him a 
specific amount. Zebe and Lawson denied the existence of any such agreement. No 
enforceable contract comes into being when parties leave a material term for future 
negotiations, creating a mere agreement to agree. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable 
Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 621 (Idaho 2010) 
Zebe' s post-assignment statements did not corroborate or confirm a contract and give 
rise to no legal or equitable obligation to reimburse Clayson. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Clayson is absolutely correct that the prevailing party on this appeal should be entitled 
to attorney fees pursuant to I. C. 12-120(3) because the gravaman of these claims involves 
a commercial transaction. Zebe and Lawson have taken that position in their Appellant's 
Brief on Appeal. 
2Clayson claimed more, but the trial court did not allow all the claimed expenses. 
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However, Clayson is incorrect that this appeal is being pursued unreasonably and 
without foundation. The issues presented by this appeal are not being pursued frivolously, 
umeasonably and without foundation. An implied in fact contract requires performance at 
another's request and nobody disputes that the refurbishment was not done at Zebe's or 
Lawson's request. The trial <::ourt instead imposed an implied in fact contract to reimburse 
Clayson from the circumstances surrounding his relinquishment of an interest in the purchase 
agreement. Because that relinquishment was covered by the assignment, no equitable remedy 
was appropriate. Furthermore, because Zehe and Lawson bought the property from a third 
party after the improvements were made they paid for the improvements. They were not 
unjustly enriched at Clayson's expense. This appeal presents valid and legitimate issues for 
resolution on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Zehe and Lawson request this Court to reverse the judgment in favor of Clayson and 
remand this matter for entry of judgment in favor of Zehe and Lawson finding that Clayson 
failed to prove an implied-in-fact or implied-in-law contract for reimbursement. Zehe and 
Lawson request their reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this appeal. 
. °{'fl'-
DATED this _E day of July, 2011. 
G 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·fl'-
I hereby certify that on the J q day of July, 2011, I served two copies of the 
foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief to: 
Blake S. Atkin 
7579 North Westside Hwy 
Clifton, ID 83228 
Atkins Law Offices 
837 South 500 West, Ste 200 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
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